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Current Circuit Splits 
The following pages contain brief summaries of circuit splits 
identified by federal court of appeals opinions announced between January 
31, 2015 and September 2, 2015.  This collection, written by the members 
of the Seton Hall Circuit Review, is organized into civil and criminal 
matters, and then by subject matter and court. 
Each summary briefly describes a current circuit split, and is 
intended to give only the briefest synopsis of the circuit split, not a 
comprehensive analysis.  This compilation makes no claim to be 
exhaustive, but aims to serve the reader well as a referential starting point. 
Preferred citation for the summaries below: Circuit Splits, 12 SETON 
HALL CIR. REV. [n] (2015). 
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CIVIL 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 
Medicare Civil Penalty – Nursing Home Deficiency Reviewability: 
Plott Nursing Home v. Burwell, 779 F.3d 975 (9th Cir. 2015) 
The 9th Circuit addressed whether an Administrative Law judge’s 
decision on an appeal of the civil penalties imposed on a nursing home for 
deficiencies must also review those deficiencies that “are not material to 
the outcome of the appeal.”  Id. at 986 (internal quotation marks omitted).  
The court noted that the 6th Circuit determined that in the interest of 
judicial economy, a judge may “choose to address only those deficiencies 
that have a material impact on the outcome of the dispute.”  Id. at 989 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  Oppositely, the 8th Circuit found that 
due to the possibility of private litigation based on unreviewed 
deficiencies, “all the adverse findings appealed should be either upheld or 
reversed.”  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).  The 9th Circuit agreed 
with the 8th Circuit that all deficiencies “must be reviewed or dismissed” 
due to the possibility of increased penalties in the future based on 
unreviewed deficiencies.  Id. at 988. 
Statute of Limitations Individuals with Disabilities Act – Attorneys’ 
Fees: Meridian Joint Sch. Dist. No. 2 v. D. A., 792 F.3d 1054 (9th Cir. 
2015) 
The 9th Circuit addressed the timeliness of suits to recover attorney’s 
fees that are filed subsequent to an administrative dispute.  Id. at 1061–62.  
Specifically, the Court addressed which statute of limitations was 
applicable to suits brought under the Individuals with Disabilities Act 
(IDEA).  Id.  The Court noted the 6th and 7th Circuits “have characterized 
attorney’s fees requests as ancillary to the dispute and have accordingly 
borrowed state statutes of limitations for judicial review of administrative 
agency decision.”  Id. at 1063.  Alternatively, the Court noted the 
11th Circuit “characterized an attorneys’ fee claim . . . as an independent 
action” and applied the state’s standard statute of limitations.  Id.  The 
Court, relying on past precedent and deferring to the trial court, reasoned 
that a request for attorney’s fees is more akin to an independent claim 
rather than an ancillary proceeding.  Id.  The Court further supported this 
distinction by highlighting that an agency’s “hearing officer” may not 
award attorney’s fees.  Id.  Thus, the 9th Circuit joined the 6th and 
7th Circuits in holding that a claim for attorney’s fees under the IDEA is 
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separate from the initial action filed and thus the statute does not begin to 
run until the suit for attorneys’ fees is brought.  Id. 
BANKING LAW 
Truth in Lending Act (“TILA”) Rescission Process – Attempt to 
Unilaterally Rescind Outside of TILA’s Three-day Period: Sanders v. 
Mt. Am. Credit Union, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 12811 (10th Cir. July 24, 
2015) 
The 10th Circuit addressed whether unilateral notification of 
cancellation automatically voids the loan contract or the security interest 
under TILA.  Id. at *12.  The court noted that the majority of circuits, 
including the 1st and 7th Circuits, have concluded that the borrower cannot 
unilaterally rescind their own obligations without also making their lender 
whole through tender; therefore, the borrower is unable to automatically 
void the security interest by tendering notice of rescission.  Id.  In contrast, 
the 11th Circuit concluded that “rescission is ‘automatic,’ but . . . voiding 
of a security interest may be judicially conditioned on borrower’s tender 
of amount due.”  Id. *12–13.  The 10th Circuit agreed with the majority of 
circuits, holding that a loan contract is not automatically void by a 
unilateral notification of cancellation, at least where “the consumer 
provides notice of an intent to rescind outside of TILA’s three-day period.  
Id. at *13. 
BANKRUPTCY LAW 
11 U.S.C.S. § 105 – Authority of Bankruptcy Court to Use Equitable 
Powers: SE Prop.Holdings, LLC v. Seaside Eng’g & Surveying (In re 
Seaside Eng’g & Surveying), 780 F.3d 1070 (11th Cir. 2015) 
The 11th Circuit addressed “whether a bankruptcy court has the 
authority to issue a non-debtor release and enjoin a non-consenting party 
who has participated fully in the bankruptcy proceedings but who has 
objected to the non-debtor release barring it from making claims against 
the non-debtor that would undermine the operations of the reorganized 
entity.”  Id. at 1077.  The court noted the 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 6th and 7th Circuits 
have all held that non-debtor releases and injunctions are “permissible.”  
Id.  The 5th, 9th and 10th Circuits have declined to allow releases of 
injunctions against non-debtors.  Id. at 1077.  The 11th Circuit agreed with 
the 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 6th and 7th Circuits because 11 U.S.C.S. § 105 codifies 
that bankruptcy courts apply equitable principles.  Id at 1078.  Therefore, 
the 11th Circuit held bankruptcy courts, utilizing their equitable power, 
may release non-debtors and enjoin non-consenting parties.  Id. 
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Garnishment of Disability Insurance – Mandatory Victims 
Restitution Act: United States v. France, 782 F.3d 820 (7th Cir. 2015) 
The 7th Circuit addressed whether a dentist’s disability insurance 
benefits were exempt from garnishment under the Mandatory Victims 
Restitution Act, 18 U.S.C.S. § 3613 and the Consumer Credit Protection 
Act.  Id. at 821.  The court noted that the 8th Circuit determined that private 
disability insurance policies constitute earnings and should be protected.  
However, the 7th Circuit found that a defendant forfeited this protection 
where the defendant did not “assert it when first delivered with the citation 
for discovery of assets.”  Id. at 823.  The court disagreed with the 8th 
Circuit because it “did not address interpretation of the list of exemptions 
in § 3613(a) and, in fact, failed to even cite that provision.”  Id. at 825.  
The 7th Circuit stated, “[t]his oversight is critical . . . because in drafting 
§3613, Congress deliberately included and excluded various kinds of 
disability income, and the exclusion of private disability cannot be 
considered an accident or oversight that should be judicially corrected.”  
Id.  Thus, the 7th Circuit concluded that the government is allowed to 
garnish from a disability insurance policy to fulfill restitution.  Id. at 821. 
Pension Funds –Trust Fund Contributions: Bos v. Bd. of Trs., 795 
F.3d 1006 (9th Cir. 2015) 
The 9th Circuit addressed whether they should recognize an 
exception to the Cline rule when determining whether or not unpaid 
contributions by employers to employee benefit funds are plan assets.  Id. 
at 1009.  The Court noted that the 11th and the 2nd Circuits determined 
that documents designating plan assets to include unpaid contributions as 
establishing fiduciary status for an employer who had authority to make 
such contributions, while the 10th and 6th Circuits found that an employer 
cannot be an Employee Retirement Income Security Act (“ERISA”) 
fiduciary with respect to unpaid contributions.  Id.  The 9th Circuit agreed 
with the 6th and 10th Circuits in finding that an employer never has 
sufficient control over a plan asset to make it a fiduciary for purposes of 
§ 523(a)(4).  Id.  Thus, the 9th Circuit concluded that an employer’s owner 
was not a fiduciary under ERISA or 11 U.S.C.S. § 523(a)(4) with respect 
to unpaid contributions to employee benefit funds, and the amount owed 
therefore could not be held nondischargeable in bankruptcy.  Id. 
Religious Freedom – Compelling Interest: Listecki v. Official Comm. 
Of Unsecured Creditors, 780 F.3d (7th Cir. 2015) 
The 7th Circuit addressed whether the Bankruptcy Code (“the 
Code”) constitutes a compelling governmental interest under the Free 
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Exercise Clause.  Id. at 745.  The court noted that the 8th Circuit found 
that in general the code does not represent a compelling governmental 
interest stating, “bankruptcy is not comparable to national security or 
public safety.”  Id. at 747.  However, the 7th Circuit disagreed stating that 
the 8th Circuit “did not take into account the importance of the code in 
Supreme Court precedent and our nation’s history.”  Id.  The court pointed 
out that “the Code aids those who have reached a certain financial 
condition and who need assistance” and thus “ensure[s] the financial 
stability of the citizenry.”  Id. at 746.  Thus, the 7th Circuit held that “there 
is a compelling interest in the code.”  Id. 
CIVIL PROCEDURE 
Appeals of Dismissals – Standards of Review: Espinoza v. Dimon, 797 
F.3d 229 (2d Cir. 2015) 
The 2nd Circuit addressed what standard of review should be used 
for Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23.1 dismissals.  Id.  at 231.  The 
Court stated that the approach taken by the 1st and 7th Circuits is to review 
Rule 23.1 dismissals de novo, “seeing no reason to treat derivative actions 
differently than any other dismissed case.”  Id. at 235.  The Court noted 
however that the D.C. and 9th Circuits are “bound to abuse-of-discretion 
review by their precedents,” despite having “questioned the wisdom of 
deferential review in this context.”  Id. The Court stated that “an appellate 
court performs exactly the same task as when reviewing the dismissal of 
any other action” when “reviewing the dismissal of a derivative claim.”  
Id.  The Court then reasoned that although the sufficiency of a complaint’s 
demand allegations depends on a fact-sensitive analysis, that is “not 
enough to justify deferential review” given that “[m]any other legal 
questions turn on the specific context of a given case, and yet they remain 
purely legal questions subject to de novo review.”  Id.  at 236.  
Accordingly, the Court sided with the 1st and 7th Circuits, discarding the 
deferential standard and holding that “dismissals under Rule 23.1 are 
reviewed de novo.”  Id. 
Judicial Review − § 1252(a)(2)(C): Garcia v. Lynch, 2015 U.S. App. 
LEXIS 14469 (9th Cir. Aug. 18, 2015) 
The 9th Circuit addressed whether 8 U.S.C.S. § 1252(a)(2)(C)’s bar 
on judicial review applies to the denial of a procedural motion such as a 
motion to continue.  Id. at *9–10.  The court noted that the 7th Circuit and 
the 5th Circuit held that the statutory language of § 1252(a)(2)(C) strips 
the court of jurisdiction over all other orders that precede the removal 
order, whether substantive or procedural in nature.  Id.  However, the 9th 
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Circuit disagreed with the 7th and 5th Circuits and held that 
§ 1252(a)(2)(C) does not preclude a review of a denial of relief that is 
based not on the “commission or admission of a crime,” but rather on the 
alien’s failure to establish his or her eligibility for the relief sought.  Id.  
The court further held that it retains jurisdiction over the removal order 
challenging the denial of relief on the merits instead of basing its review 
on a qualifying conviction.  Id. 
Jurisdiction – Choice of Forum; JPMorgan Chase Bank: N.A. v. 
Winget, 602 Fed. Appx. 246 (6th Cir. 2015) 
The 6th Circuit addressed whether, in light of the Supreme Court’s 
holding in Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594 (2011), the bankruptcy court 
is the appropriate forum for the delay defense.  Id. at 259.  In Stern, the 
Supreme Court held that an individual’s state law counterclaim was 
independent of federal bankruptcy law, and therefore could not be ruled 
on in bankruptcy court.  Id. at 261.  The 6th Circuit acknowledged a circuit 
split regarding the applicability of Stern.  Id. at 261.  The 9th Circuit 
previously held that state law fraudulent transfer claims could not be heard 
in the bankruptcy court in consideration of Stern.  Id.  Conversely, the 5th 
Circuit held that the bankruptcy court had authority to issue judgment on 
a creditor’s claim because the claim was “inextricably intertwined with the 
interpretation of a right created by federal bankruptcy law.”  Id.  This court 
agreed with the 5th Circuit, that the holding in Stern does not deprive the 
bankruptcy court of its jurisdiction to consider the delay defense because 
it is a challenge to the value of bankruptcy assets.  Id. 
Jurisdiction – Yearsley Immunity: Adkisson v. Jacobs Eng’g Grp., 
Inc., 790 F.3d 641 (6th Cir. 2015) 
The 6th Circuit addressed whether “Yearsley immunity pose[s] a 
jurisdictional bar.”  Id. at 646.  The court noted that the 4th Circuit has 
held that the bar is jurisdictional, reasoning that “Yearsley derivatively 
extend[s] sovereign immunity to a private contractor.”  Id. at 646.  In 
contrast, the 5th Circuit held that Yearsley immunity is not jurisdictional, 
reasoning that “Yearsley does not discuss sovereign immunity or 
otherwise address the court’s power to hear the case” so “concluding 
Yearsley is applicable does not deny the court of subject-matter 
jurisdiction.”  Id. at 647 (internal quotation marks omitted).  The 6th 
Circuit agreed with the 5th Circuit holding that “Yearsley is not 
jurisdictional in nature.”  Id. The court reasoned that “Yearsley immunity 
is . . . closer in nature to qualified immunity for private individuals under 
government contract, which is an issue to be reviewed on the merits rather 
than for jurisdiction.”  Id. 
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Legal standard – District Courts Recalling Jurors After Dismissal: 
Dietz v. Bouldin, 794 F.3d 1093 (9th Cir. 2015) 
The 9th Circuit “addressed when a district court abuses its discretion 
by recalling jurors after dismissing them,” and what legal standard governs 
this analysis.  Id.  at 1096.  The court noted that the 2nd, 3rd, 4th, and 7th 
Circuits have undertaken case-specific analyses and “have recognized that 
in certain limited circumstances, a district court may recall a jury 
immediately after dismissal to correct an error in its verdict,” or have 
allowed for recall after dismissal in “situations where the jurors have been 
released but effectively remained under [the] control of the court.”  Id. at 
1097.  On the other hand, the court noted that the 8th Circuit “eschewed 
this case-specific analysis and instead adopted a restrictive bright-line rule 
prohibiting recall once the jurors have left the confines of the courtroom.”  
Id. at 1098.  The 9th Circuit agreed with the majority of the circuits, 
finding that the totality of circumstances analysis “strikes a sensible 
balance between fairness and economy” if “a proper inquiry into the 
circumstances [is made] to ensure jurors were not exposed to prejudicial 
influences during the brief period of dismissal.”  Id. at 1099.  The 9th 
Circuit disagreed with the 8th Circuit as to its rigid rule regarding the 
courtroom door “[p]recisely because we live in an age of instant electronic 
communication,” making the courtroom door an improper place to draw 
the line between exposure to outside influences and protection from such 
influences.  Id.  Thus, the 9th Circuit concluded “that in limited 
circumstances, a court may recall a jury shortly after it has been dismissed 
to correct an error in the verdict, but only after making an appropriate 
inquiry to determine that the jurors were not exposed to any outside 
influences that would compromise their ability to fairly reconsider the 
verdict.”  Id. at 1100. 
Maritime Law – In Personam Claims: United States v. Jantran, 782 
F.3d 1177 (10th Cir. 2015) 
The 10th Circuit addressed whether the Government can bring an in 
personam claim against a ship owner or operator under §408 of the Rivers 
& Harbors Act (the “Act”).  Id. at 1178.  While the Act does not expressly 
authorize in personam claims, it does authorize the Government to proceed 
in rem against any vessel used to violate the Act.  Id. at 1179.  The 5th 
Circuit, relying on the plain language of the Act, found that § 408 does not 
authorize in personam actions.  Id. at 1182.  Dissimilarly, “the [6th] Circuit 
allowed an in personam recovery against a ship owner under §408.”  The 
6th Circuit relied on the reasoning of a previous case that allowed in 
personam recovery for a different section of the Act.  Id. at 1181.  The 
10th Circuit agreed with the 5th Circuit’s plain language interpretation of 
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the Act and held that “the Government may not bring in personam actions 
against vessel owners for violations of § 408 of the Act.”  Id. at 1184. 
Prisoner Litigation Reform Act – Prisoner Payment of Filing Fees: 
Siluk v. Merwin, 783 F.3d 421 (3d Cir. 2014) 
The 3rd Circuit addressed “whether the Prisoner Litigation Reform 
Act [28 U.S.C. § 1915] requires recoupment of multiple encumbrances 
sequentially or simultaneously.”  Id. at 423 (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  Section 1915(b)(2) of the Act requires a prisoner to make 
monthly payments equal to 20 percent of the[ir] preceding month[s] 
income.”  Id.  The 5th, 7th, 10th, and D.C. Circuits, have held that 
simultaneous payments should be made when multiple filing fees are 
owed, therefore requiring a monthly 20 percent deduction for each 
concurrent case that the prisoner owes filing fees for.  Id.  Contrary, the 
2nd and 4th Circuits, have held that sequential payments only require a 
single “20-percent deduction from [a prisoner’s] prison account each 
month” when the prisoner owes multiple filing fees.  Id.  The 3rd Circuit 
joined the 2nd and 4th Circuits, finding that sequential payments fulfill 
Congress’s intent to deter frivolous litigation, while not imposing 
significant burdens on a prisoner.  Id. at 427. 
Removal – Rule of Unanimity: Griffioen v. Cedar Rapids & Iowa City 
Ry. Co., 785 F.3d 1182 (8th Cir. 2015) 
The 8th Circuit addressed “whether a representation in a removing 
defendant’s notice stating that its codefendants consent can satisfy 
§ 1446’s unanimity requirement.”  Id at 1187.  The court noted that the 
4th, 6th, and 9th Circuits have held that “a statement in a defendant’s 
timely removal notice [on behalf of his or her] codefendants [consenting 
to removal] is sufficient.”  Id at 1186.  On the other hand, the 5th and 7th 
Circuits have suggested that in most situations a defendant cannot give 
notice of consent on behalf of another defendant.  Id.  The 5th Circuit held 
that a notice of consent is allowed only by the defendant itself or by 
someone with authority to act on behalf of the defendant.  Id at 1187.  The 
court further noted that “[t]he 2011 amendments to § 1446 that codified 
the rule of unanimity did not describe the form of or time frame for consent 
when multiple defendants are involved.”  Id.  Thus, the 8th Circuit agreed 
with the 4th, 6th, and 9th Circuits holding that a defendant’s timely 
removal notice showing consent on behalf of codefendants is sufficient.  
Id. at 1188. 
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Settlements – Offers of Judgment: Hooks v. Landmark Indus., 797 
F.3d 309 (5th Cir. 2015) 
The 5th Circuit addressed “whether a complete [Federal] Rule [of 
Civil Procedure] 68 offer of judgment moots an individual’s claim.”  Id. 
at 314.  The 5th Circuit noted that the 3rd, 4th, 6th, 7th, 10th, and Federal 
Circuits “have all held that a complete Rule 68 offer moots an individual’s 
claim” while the 2nd, 9th, and 11th Circuits “have held that an 
unaccepted Rule 68 offer cannot moot an individual’s claim.”  Id. The 5th 
Circuit stated that “Rule 68 considers an unaccepted offer to be 
withdrawn” consistent with the “hornbook law that the rejection of an offer 
nullifies the offer.”  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).  The 5th Circuit 
then posited that giving “controlling effect” to an unaccepted Rule 68 offer 
would be “flatly inconsistent” with the Rule.  Id. Furthermore, the 5th 
Circuit reasoned that “[a] contrary ruling would serve to allow 
defendants to unilaterally moot named-plaintiffs’ claims in the class action 
context–even though the plaintiff, having turned the offer down, would 
receive no actual relief.”  Id.  Therefore, the 5th Circuit joined the 3rd, 4th, 
6th, 7th, 10th, and Federal Circuits in holding that “an unaccepted offer of 
judgment to a named plaintiff in a class action is a legal nullity, with no 
operative effect.”  Id.  (internal quotation marks omitted). 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
Article III Standing – Class Action Lawsuits: Neale v. Volvo Cars of 
N. Am., LLC, 794 F.3d 353 (3d Cir. 2015) 
The 3rd Circuit addressed the question of what Article III requires of 
putative, unnamed class members during a Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure Rule 23 motion for class certification, specifically, whether all 
class members must possess standing.  Id. at 359–60.  The 3rd Circuit 
noted that the 2nd Circuit has held that while each member of a class need 
not submit evidence of personal standing, “no class may be certified that 
contains members lacking Article III standing.”  Id. at 365.  The 3rd 
Circuit reasoned that the 8th Circuit has held “a [state] law that permitted 
a single injured plaintiff to bring a class action on behalf of a group of 
uninjured individuals was “inconsistent with the doctrine of standing . . . . 
[stating a] class must be defined in such a way that anyone within it would 
have standing.”  Id. at 366.  The 3rd Circuit also noted that the D.C. Circuit 
requires all class members to prove they were in fact injured, but does not 
require all to prove standing.  Id.  The 3rd Circuit disagreed with its sister 
circuits, holding that “so long as a named class representative has standing, 
a class action presents a valid case or controversy under Article III.”  Id. 
at 369 (internal quotation marks omitted).  The 3rd Circuit reasoned that 
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unnamed class members are generally unknown when a class action suit 
is filed and are only identified through discovery.  Id. at 367. 
Fifth Amendment – Equal Protection: Morales-Santana v. Lynch, 792 
F.3d 256 (2d Cir. 2015) 
The 2nd Circuit addressed the constitutionality of the Immigration 
and Nationality Act of 1952, which requires a more difficult standard for 
citizenship when a child is born outside of the United States to unwed 
parents where only the father is a United States citizen as compared to 
when only the mother is a citizen.  Id. at 258–59.  The 9th Circuit noted 
that the “Government has carried its burden of showing an exceedingly 
persuasive justification for the statute’s gender-based classification as a 
means of addressing the problem of statelessness,” which would not place 
the statute in violation of the Fifth Amendment.  Id. at 273  n.17  (internal 
citations omitted).  The 2nd Circuit disagreed with the 9th Circuit because 
“the Government has not shown that the problem arose – or was perceived 
to arise – more often with citizen mothers than with citizen fathers of 
children born out of wedlock abroad.”  Id.  Thus, the 2nd Circuit held that 
a child born outside of the United States to parents out of wedlock where 
one is a citizen and the other is not, attains citizenship where the citizen 
parent has spent at least one continuous year inside of the United States 
prior to the child’s birth.  Id. at 272–73. 
Second Amendment – Unauthorized Aliens: United States v. Meza-
Rodriguez, 798 F.3d 664 (7th Cir. 2015) 
The 7th Circuit addressed whether the Second Amendment right to 
bear arms protects unauthorized aliens within the borders of the United 
States.  Id. at 669.  The court noted that the 4th, 5th, and 8th Circuits 
determined that the Second Amendment does not protect unauthorized 
citizens.  Id.  The 7th Circuit recognized that unauthorized aliens enjoy 
other constitutional rights when they have come within the territory of the 
United States, and have developed substantial connections with the United 
States.  Id. at 670.  The 7th Circuit disagreed with the 4th, 5th, and 8th 
Circuits as the court did not believe that the Second Amendment provides 
anything special that excludes unauthorized aliens, while other 
constitutional rights do not exclude them.  Id. at 671.  Thus, the 7th Circuit 
concluded that the Second Amendment right to bear arms does not exclude 
unauthorized aliens.  Id. 
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COPYRIGHT LAW 
Federal Preemption – Federal Copyright Protection: Spear Mktg. v. 
BancorpSouth Bank, 791 F.3d 586 (5th Cir. 2015) 
The 5th Circuit addressed whether state law claims based on ideas 
fixed in tangible media are preempted by the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. 
§ 301(a).  Id. at 597.  The 5th Circuit specifically examined whether 
preemption “extends to all works satisfying the requirements of [the 
statute], even those that also contain noncopyrightable material.”  Id. at 
594.  The court noted that the 2nd, 4th, 6th and 7th Circuits determined 
that “for the purpose of preemption under § 301(a), ideas fixed in tangible 
media fall within the subject matter of copyright.”  Id. at 596.  Oppositely, 
the 11th Circuit held “[i]deas are substantively ineligible for copyright 
protection and, therefore, are categorically excluded from the subject 
matter of copyright even if expressed in a tangible medium.”  Id.  (internal 
citations omitted).  The 5th Circuit held with the majority of circuits 
reasoning that it was Congress’ intention for the “Copyright Act to protect 
some expressions but not others,”  furthermore, Congress “wrote § 301(a) 
to ensure that the states did not undo this decision.”  Id.  Therefore, the 5th 
Circuit held that “state law claims based on ideas fixed in tangible media 
are preempted by § 301(a).  Id. at 597. 
EMPLOYMENT LAW 
Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) – 29 USC 
§ 1113: Fulghum v. Embarq Corp., 785 F.3d 395 (10th Cir. 2015) 
The 10th Circuit addressed an ambiguity in a provision of the statute 
of limitations for filing for a breach of fiduciary duty where the ambiguous 
language at issue stated: “providing that in the case of fraud or 
concealment, a civil enforcement action may be commenced not later than 
six years after the date of discovery of [the] breach or violation.”  Id. at 
413 (internal quotation marks omitted).  The 10th Circuit noted that the 
1st, 3rd, 7th, 8th, 9th and D.C. Circuits determined that the “fraud or 
concealment” provision applies only when a fiduciary conceals the alleged 
breach. The 10th Circuit also noted that the 2nd Circuit found the provision 
applicable when a plaintiff’s breach of fiduciary duty claim is based on 
fraud, where the defendant had acted to conceal its breach.  Id. at 414.  The 
10th Circuit took a novel position on the issue, concluding that the 
provision is an exception to the general statute of limitations, and applies 
“when the alleged breach of fiduciary duty involves a claim the defendant 
made a false representation of a matter of fact, whether by words of 
conduct, by false or misleading allegations or by concealment of that 
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which should have been disclosed, which deceives and is intended to 
deceive another so that he shall act upon it to his legal injury or when the 
defendant conceals the alleged breach of fiduciary duty.”  Id. at 415 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
False Claims Act – Scope: United States v. Sanford-Brown, Ltd., 788 
F.3d 696 (7th Cir. 2015) 
The 7th Circuit addressed whether consequences under the Federal 
Claims Act (“FCA”) are triggered for violating Title IV Restrictions after 
good faith entry into a program participation agreement (“PPA”).  Id. at 
711.  The 7th Circuit noted that the 9th Circuit determined that a PPA 
conditions the initial and continued participation of an eligible institution 
upon compliance with Title IV of the Higher Education Act, while the 8th 
Circuit found violations of Title IV Restrictions after good faith entry into 
Title IV do not trigger FCA liability.  Id. at 710.  The 7th Circuit agreed 
with the 8th Circuit finding good-faith entry into a PPA as the condition 
of payment necessary to be eligible under the subsidies program, and 
absent evidence of fraud before entry, non-performance after entry into an 
agreement for government subsidies does not impose liability under the 
FCA.  Id.  The 7th Circuit disagreed with the 9th Circuit, because adopting 
the 9th Circuit’s position would mean that any conditions in a PPA that 
are not met could impose strict liability under the FCA, leading to 
untenable results.  Id. at 711.  Thus, the 7th Circuit concluded FCA 
consequences are not triggered where a violation of Title IV Restrictions 
occurs after good-faith entry into a PPA.  Id. at 710–11. 
Retaliatory Discrimination – McDonnell Douglas Legal Standard: 
Foster v. Univ. of Maryland-Eastern Shore, 787 F.3d 243 (4th Cir. 2015) 
The 4th Circuit addressed whether University of Texas Southwestern 
Medical Center v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517 (2013) had “any bearing on the 
causation prong of the prima facie case” of employment retaliatory 
discrimination.  Id. at 251.  The court noted that the 6th and 11th Circuits 
“require evidence of but-for causation in order to establish a prima facie case;” 
while the 2nd, 5th, 6th, and 11th Circuits “have held, either expressly or 
implicitly, that Nassar did not alter the elements of a prima facie case.”  
Id. at 252 n.10.  The 4th Circuit disagreed with the 6th and 11th Circuits 
because “adopting the contrary rule (and applying the ultimate causation 
standard at the prima facie stage) would be tantamount to eliminating the 
McDonnell Douglas framework in retaliation cases by restricting the use 
of pretext evidence to those plaintiffs who do not need it.”  Id. at 251.  
Thus, the 4th Circuit concluded “that Nassar does not alter the causation 
prong of a prima facie case of retaliation.”  Id. 
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Statutory Interpretation – Fair Labor Standards Act: Greathouse v. 
JHS Sec. Inc., 784 F.3d 105 (2nd Cir. 2015) 
The 2nd Circuit addressed whether an employee pursuing a claim for 
unlawful retaliation must do more than voice an equal pay complaint to a 
supervisor to invoke the Equal Pay Act of 1963 (“EPA”) § 215(a)(3)’s 
protections.  Id. at 110.  The 2nd Circuit noted that the 1st, 4th, 5th, 7th, 
8th, 9th, 10th, and 11th Circuits have determined that section 215(a)(3) 
protects employees from retaliation for their complaints made to 
employers, while the 6th Circuit found that complaints to an employer are 
covered by section 215(a)(3).  Id.  The 2nd Circuit agreed with the [1st, 
4th, 5th, 7th, 8th, 9th, 10th, and 11th] Circuits, finding that section 
215(a)(3) prohibits retaliation against employees who orally complain to 
their employers, so long as their complaint is “sufficiently clear and 
detailed for a reasonable employer to understand it, in light of both content 
and context, as an assertion of rights protected by the statute and a call for 
their protection.”  Id. at 117. 
IMMIGRATION LAW 
Illegal Aliens Disputes – Notice Entitlement from the Immigration 
Court: Gaye v. Lynch, 788 F.3d 519 (6th Cir. 2015) 
The 6th Circuit addressed whether the Immigration and Nationality 
Act of 1952 (INA) or its amended version, the REAL ID Act, entitles the 
asylum seeker to notice of what type of corroborating evidence is required 
of him.  Id. at 529.  The 7th Circuit has held that entitling notice “would 
create the result that a petitioner must receive additional notice from the 
[immigration judge] and then an additional opportunity to provide 
corroborative evidence before an adverse ruling, [and thus] necessitate two 
hearings.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).  Oppositely, the 9th 
Circuit has held “not only that an alien is entitled to such notice, but indeed 
that the REAL ID Act unambiguously requires such notice.”  Id.  The 6th 
Circuit agreed with the 7th Circuit holding that, “the INA – either the 
version that governed in 2001 or as amended by the REAL ID Act – does 
not entitle him to any such notice.”  Id.  The 6th Circuit reasoned that the 
text of the INA “does not suggest that the alien is entitled to notice from 
the [immigration judge] as to what evidence the alien must present.”  Id. 
at 530. 
Post-entry Lawful Permanent Resident – Waiver of Inadmissibility: 
Medina-Rosales v. Holder, 778 F.3d 1140 (10th Cir. 2015) 
The 10th Circuit addressed whether “Lawful Permanent Residents 
(“LPR”) who acquire that status after living in the United States and who 
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later are convicted of an aggravated felony are eligible for consideration 
for a waiver of inadmissibility under § 1182(h).”  Id. at 1143.  The 10th 
Circuit noted that the 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th, 9th, and 11th Circuits 
determined that the language of § 1182(h) precludes eligibility for a waiver 
after conviction of an aggravated felony only if the alien received LPR 
status at the time the alien lawfully entered the United States, but it does 
not apply to an alien who obtained LPR status after having been present in 
the United States before acquiring that status.  The 8th Circuit disagreed 
and found that the language of the statute is ambiguous and therefore that 
any alien convicted of an aggravated felony after becoming an LPR, 
regardless of when or how that status was acquired, is ineligible for a 
waiver of inadmissibility.  Id.  The 10th Circuit agreed with the majority 
of circuits and found the plain meaning of the statute’s language and the 
statutory definitions of relevant terms were persuasive. Id.  The 10th 
Circuit disagreed with the 8th Circuit’s finding that the statutory language 
was ambiguous, barring all LPR requests for waivers.  Id.  Thus, the 10th 
Circuit concluded that only persons who obtained LPR status before or 
when they entered the United States are barred from seeking a waiver 
under § 1182(h).  Id. at 1145. 
PATENT LAW 
Patent Infringement – Collateral Estoppel: United Access Techs., LLC 
v. CenturyTel Broadband Servs. LLC, 778 F.3d 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2015) 
The Federal Circuit addressed which Restatement of Judgments 
should be adopted regarding collateral estoppel when “the decision of the 
first tribunal rests on alternative grounds[.]”  Id. at 1333.  The First 
Restatement of Judgments takes the stance collateral estoppel can apply to 
each alternative ground, while The Second Restatement of Judgments 
states that no alternative grounds are “entitled to be accorded collateral 
estoppel effect.”  Id.  The Federal Circuit noted the 2nd, 3rd and 9th 
Circuits have adopted the First Restatement of Judgments, while the 4th, 
5th, 7th, and 10th Circuits have adopted the Second Restatement of 
Judgments.  Id.  The Federal Circuit held that “[i]n a case such as this one, 
involving general principles of the law of judgments that do not implicate 
questions within this court’s exclusive jurisdiction, [the court] appl[ies] 
the law of the regional circuit, which in this case is the [3]rd Circuit.”  Id. 
at 1330 n.1.  Thus, the Federal Circuit adopted the First Restatement of 
Judgments as the 3rd Circuit has.  Id. at 1333 n.2. 
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SECURITIES LAW 
Interpretation of “alleging” – Securities Litigation Uniform 
Standards Act of 1998: Criterium Capital Funds B.V. v. Tremont 
(Berm.), Ltd. (In re Kingate Mgmt. Litig.), 784 F.3d 128 (2d Cir. 2015) 
The 2nd Circuit addressed when the Securities Litigation Uniform 
Standards Act’s (SLUSA’s) ambiguous term “alleging” should be deemed 
satisfied by a complaint.  Id. at 146.  The 2nd Circuit noted that the 3rd 
and 6th Circuits’ decisions on the issue “may be read to mean that 
SLUSA’s ambiguous term ‘alleging’ should be deemed satisfied whenever 
a complaint includes allegations of false conduct (of the sort specified in 
SLUSA) that is essential to the success of the state law claim, even if that 
conduct is alleged to have been done by third persons without the 
defendant’s complicity.”  Id.  The 2nd Circuit disagreed with the 3rd and 
6th Circuits since SLUSA’s text, purposes, and history provide no 
reasonable justification “for construing SLUSA as barring state-law 
claims that do not depend on conduct by the defendant falling within 
SLUSA’s specifications of conduct prohibited by the anti-falsity 
provisions of the [Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act 
of 1934].”  Id. at 149.  The 2nd Circuit created a new standard concluding 
“that SLUSA’s preclusion applies when the state law claim is predicated 
on conduct of the defendant specified in SLUSA’s operative provisions,” 
referencing the 1933 and 1934 Acts’ anti-falsity provisions.  Id. 
NATIVE AMERICAN LAW 
National Labor Relations Act – Authority & Jurisdiction: NLRB v. 
Little River Band of Ottawa Indians Tribal Gov’t, 788 F.3d 537 (6th Cir. 
2015) 
The 6th Circuit addressed whether a federal statute creating a 
comprehensive regulatory scheme presumptively applies to Indian tribes.  
Id. at 539.  The court noted that the 7th, 8th, and 11th Circuits determined 
that federal statutes creating a comprehensive regulatory scheme do 
presumptively apply to Indian tribes, while the 9th Circuit determined that 
the presumption is limited by some exceptions.  Id. at 547.  The 6th Circuit 
agreed with the 9th Circuit in finding that a federal statute of general 
applicability that is silent on the issue of applicability to Indian tribes will 
not apply to them if: “(1) the law touches exclusive rights of self-
governance in purely intramural matters; (2) the application of the law to 
the tribe would abrogate rights guaranteed by Indian treaties; or (3) there 
is proof by legislative history or some other means that Congress intended 
[the law] not to apply to Indians on their reservations.”  Id. at 548, 549–
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50.  The court disagreed with the 7th, 8th, and 11th Circuits, finding that 
these statutes did not automatically apply to Indian tribes.  Id. at 547, 549–
50.  Thus, the 6th Circuit concluded that the application of federal statutes 
to Indian tribes does not always apply.  Id. at 549–50. 
PUBLIC HEALTH & WELFARE LAW 
Social Security – Disability Determinations: Zavalin v. Colvin, 778 
F.3d 842 (9th Cir. 2015) 
The 9th Circuit addressed whether an individual’s functional 
capacity may conflict with the ability required of that individual to perform 
a Level 3 Reasoning job on the Department of Labor’s General Education 
Development scale.  Id. at 846.  The court noted that the 10th Circuit found 
that a conflict does exist between a claimant’s limitation to do “simple and 
routine work tasks” and the demands of Level 3 Reasoning, while the 7th 
and 8th Circuits found that no such conflict exists.  Id.  The 9th Circuit 
joined the 10th Circuit in holding that an individual’s limitation to perform 
simple routine tasks is in conflict with the requirements of Level 3 because 
“it may be difficult for a person limited to simple, repetitive tasks to follow 
instructions in diagrammatic form as such instructions can be abstract”.  
Id. at 847 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 
Class Action Suits – Lodestar Method: Levitt v. Southwest Airlines Co. 
(In re Southwest Airlines Voucher Litig., 799 F.3d 701 (7th Cir. 2015) 
The 7th Circuit addressed whether 28 U.S.C. § 1712 allowed a 
district court to use the lodestar method to calculate the fee award for class 
council.  Id. at 707.  The court noted that the 9th Circuit determined that 
subsection (a) of the statute prohibits the use of the lodestar method for 
coupon settlements that do not provide injunctive relief.  Id. at *14–15.  
The 7th Circuit used methods of statutory interpretation, including the 
canon against surplusage, to determine that the words “attributable to” 
mean more than just the plain meaning of the words.  Id.  The 7th Circuit 
disagreed with the 9th Circuit as the 9th Circuit took the plain meaning 
approach to the words “attributable to,” finding that the words only mean 
“caused by.”  Id.  Thus, the 7th Circuit concluded that the words 
“attributable to” in § 1712(a) have more than just a plain meaning, and 
therefore a district court could use the lodestar method to calculate 
attorney fees to compensate class counsel for the coupon relief obtained 
for the class.  Id. at 710. 
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District Court Discretion – False Claims Act: United States ex rel. 
Rigsby v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 794 F.3d 457 (5th Cir. 2015) 
The 5th Circuit addressed whether 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(2), of the 
False Claims Act (FCA), which requires that a “copy of the complaint and 
written disclosure of substantially all material evidence and information 
the person possesses shall be served on the government” and must “remain 
under seal until the court orders it served on the defendant[,]”compels a 
dismissal of a case if the seal is violated.  Id. at 470.  The 9th Circuit 
requires district courts to “evaluate three factors[,] [known as the Lujan 
test,] in determining whether dismissal was warranted:1) the harm to the 
government from the violations; 2) the nature of the violations; and 3) 
whether the violations were made willfully or in bad faith.”  Id. The 2nd 
Circuit adopted a similar standard.  Id.  However, the 6th Circuit has held 
that “any violation of the seal requirement, no matter how trivial, requires 
dismissal.”  Id. at 471.  The 5th Circuit reasoned that the purpose of the 
FCA was to encourage more private FCA actions and mandating dismissal 
for trivial violations of § 3730(b)(2) would be contrary to that purpose.  Id. 
at 471.  Thus, the court joined the 2nd and 9th Circuits in applying the 
Lujan test to determine whether dismissal is appropriate when 
§ 3730(b)(2) is violated.  Id. 
Retirement Plans – Defining Normal Retirement Age: Laurent v. 
PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP, 794 F.3d 272 (2d Cir. 2015) 
The 2nd Circuit addressed whether retirement plan sponsors can 
define a plan’s normal retirement age as “five years of service.”  Id. at 273.  
The court first noted that the Employee Retirement Income Security Act 
of 1974 (ERISA) describes an option for the normal retirement age as “the 
5th anniversary of the time a plan participant commenced participation in 
the plan,” but only after the participant turns 65 years old.  Id. at 274.  The 
7th Circuit said a plan that defined normal retirement age as “five years on 
the job” did not violate ERISA because “[t]he Plan’s formula—the 
participant’s age when beginning work, plus five years—is an ‘age’” and 
because the Plan took the formula from ERISA’s definition.  Id. at 238.  
The 7th Circuit held that five years on the job is an acceptable, normal 
retirement age merely because it is an age.  Id. at 283.  The 2nd Circuit 
disagreed with the 7th Circuit because the 2nd Circuit maintained that a 
plan’s normal retirement age must have a “relationship to the age at which 
plan participants normally retire because the phrase is used to trigger 
certain benefits or adjustments.”  Id. at 238.  As such, the 2nd Circuit found 
that the retirement plan at issue was invalid.  Id. at 285. 
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CRIMINAL 
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
Administrative Proceedings – Admissibility of Evidence: Yanez-
Marquez v. Lynch, 789 F.3d 434 (4th Cir. 2015) 
The 4th Circuit addressed whether the ‘qualified immunity’ approach 
or the ‘totality of the circumstances’ approach applies “when a violation 
of the Fourth Amendment is egregious such that it transgresses notions of 
fundamental fairness.”  Id. at 453.  The court noted that the 9th Circuit 
determined that the qualified immunity approach should be applied, while 
the 2nd, 3rd, and 8th Circuits found that the totality of circumstances 
approach should be applied.  Id.  The 4th Circuit agreed with the 2nd, 3rd, 
and 8th Circuits in finding that the totality of circumstances approach 
should be applied.  Id. at 459.  The court reasoned that the totality of 
circumstances approach is a “flexible case-by-case standard, taking into 
account a variety of factors.  It allows the court to examine all of the facts 
it deems relevant to the egregiousness inquiry and focuses on the 
unreasonableness of the conduct of the law enforcement officers.”  Id. at 
460.  The 4th Circuit further noted that an “alien’s evidence, in its totality, 
must support a basis to suppress the challenged evidence under a finding 
of egregiousness, even at the prima facie case stage. Id.  The court 
reasoned that such evidence cannot be based on intuition or speculation, 
especially as it relates to the intent of law enforcement officers.  Id.  The 
4th Circuit noted that suppression hearings should be the exception, not 
the rule in removal proceedings, so the alien’s evidentiary burden, even at 
the prima facie case stage, is high.”  Id. at 461 (internal citations omitted).  
The 4th Circuit disagreed with the 9th Circuit as the qualified immunity 
approach “requires a suppression hearing any time an alien alleges that the 
law enforcement officers acted in bad faith  . . .  [which] sets the 
evidentiary proffer bar too low.”  Id. at 459.  Thus, the 4th Circuit held 
that the totality of the circumstances approach applies when assessing the 
egregiousness of a Fourth Amendment violation.  Id. 
Criminal Sentencing – Appellate Review: United States v. Doe, 2015 
U.S. App. LEXIS 15578 (3d Cir. Sept. 2, 2015) 
The 3rd Circuit addressed whether a Begay error, the 
mischaracterization of a crime or offense that results in a sentence 
enhancement, is debatably constitutional and therefore cognizable for 
collateral review under 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2).  Id. at *24.  The 4th Circuit 
stated that “it [was] at least debatable that [the] erroneous application of 
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the career offender enhancement deprives [a defendant] of his liberty in 
violation of his due process rights.”  Id. at *23.  The 8th Circuit, however, 
held that a “Begay claim, far from being constitutional, was not even 
cognizable in a § 2255 case.”  Id.  The 3rd Circuit agreed with the 4th 
Circuit, and found the error at least debatably constitutional.  The court 
held “that the claim is cognizable, at least in cases arising under the 
mandatory Guidelines.”  Id. at *57. 
Deportation – Sentencing Enhancements: United States v. Kosmes, 
792 F.3d 973 (8th Cir. 2015) 
The 8th Circuit addressed the mens rea standard to consider a crime 
“violent” concerning the 16-level sentencing enhancement of 18 U.S.C. 
Appx. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii).  Id. at 974.  The court noted that the 10th 
Circuit required purpose or intent, while the 3rd, 4th and 5th Circuits 
required recklessness.  Id. at 976.  The 8th Circuit agreed with the 3rd, 4th 
and 5th Circuits in finding that the 4th Circuit precedent was based on the 
Model Penal Code, which provides the “best generic federal definition.”  
Id. at 977.  Additionally, the 8th Circuit noted that the 10th Circuit has 
“questioned its holding . . . . [I]t is possible that at least some crimes with 
a recklessness element might be crimes of violence.”  Id. at 978 n.6 
(internal citations omitted).  Thus, the 8th Circuit concluded that 
recklessness constitutes “violent crime” allowing for a 16-level sentencing 
enhancement.  Id. at 978. 
Extradition – Speedy Trial Clause: Martinez v. United States, 793 F.3d 
533 (6th Cir. 2015) 
The 6th Circuit addressed whether a treaty with Mexico concerning 
extradition is subject to the Speedy Trial Clause of the Sixth Amendment 
of the United States Constitution.  Id. at 544.  The Court noted that the 
11th Circuit determined that the “lapse of time” provision in the treaty did 
not invoke protection under the Speedy Trial Clause.  Id. at 545.  The Court 
disagreed with the 11th Circuit, relying on precedent and statutory 
interpretation, which encourages a more liberal interpretation of the treaty 
when provisions or terms are ambiguous.  Id. at 547.  Thus, the 6th Circuit 
concluded that the treaty allows a petitioner to invoke the Sixth 
Amendment if a certain amount of time has passed between a crime 
committed and the extradition request.  Id. at 548. 
Remedies – Calculation of Damages: United States v. Martin, 796 F.3d 
1101 (9th Cir.  2015) 
The 9th Circuit considered whether Application Note 3(F)(v) of the 
United States Sentencing Commission Guidelines Manual should be 
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applied to the use of fraud to secure minority-business certifications.  Id. 
at 1110.  The 7th Circuit “has held that the use of fraud to secure minority-
business certifications fits . . . within the scheme considered by 
Application Note 3(F)(v)” of the United States Sentencing Commission 
Guidelines Manual.  Id. (internal quotations omitted).  “Application Note 
3(F)(v) provides that where regulatory approval by a government agency 
is obtained by fraud, the loss shall include the amount paid for the 
property, services, or goods transferred, rendered, or misrepresented, with 
no credit provided for the value of those items or services.”  Id. (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  The 9th Circuit disagreed with the 7th Circuit’s 
decision to apply the rule reasoning that “the rule of lenity counsels against 
an expansive interpretation of the application note, particularly where, as 
discussed below, another application note is a closer fit to these 
circumstances.”  Id. 
Sentencing – Adjustments and Enhancements: United States v. 
Cramer, 777 F.3d 597 (2d Cir. 2015) 
The 2nd Circuit addressed whether “[a]pplication Note 4 to [U.S. 
Sentencing Guidelines] section 2G1.3 [is] plainly inconsistent with [U.S. 
Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 2G.1.3(b)(3)(B)] and therefore 
inapplicable to that subsection.”  Id. at 600.  The court noted that the 4th 
and 5th Circuits have held that the Application Note relates only to the 
minor-inducement subsection of the provision, and Application Note 4 
was inconsistent with § 2G.1.3(b)(3)(B), while the 7th Circuit found that 
the enhancement did not apply in spite of its plain language.  Id. at 604, 
606.  The 2nd Circuit agreed with the 4th and 5th Circuits that Application 
Note 4 is plainly inconsistent with § 2G.1.3(b)(3)(B).  Id. at 606.  The court 
reasoned that the language of § 2G.1.3(b)(3)(B) is clear, and there is “no 
indication that the drafters of the Guidelines intended to limit this plain 
language through Application Note 4.”  Id.  Thus, the 2nd Circuit 
concluded “Application Note 4 does not preclude an enhancement 
under Guidelines section 2G1.3(b)(3)(B) when a defendant solicits third 
parties to engage in prohibited sexual conduct with a minor, even if neither 
the minor nor someone who exercises custody, care, or supervisory control 
over the minor is involved directly in the communication.”  Id. at 607. 
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 
Choice of Law – U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual 
§ 7B1.1(a)(1)(A)(i): United States v. Willis, 795 F.3d 986 (9th Cir. 2015) 
The 9th Circuit addressed whether a court should use the applicable 
federal, state, or local offense or the defendant’s conduct to determine 
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whether an uncharged offense constitutes a federal crime of violence.  Id. 
at 993.  The 2nd Circuit previously found that a determining what 
constitutes a crime of violence requires a court to compare the defendant’s 
actual conduct to the federal definition of the crime.  Id.  The 3rd Circuit 
has held that “the categorical approach is necessarily not applicable in the 
revocation context.”  Id. at 993 n.5.  The 9th Circuit disagreed with the 
2nd and 3rd Circuits; instead, the 9th Circuit concluded that a court must 
identify the particular crime for which the defendant was responsible, and 
determine whether that crime, rather than the defendant’s conduct, 
contains an element of force to determine if the crime was a crime of 
violence.  Id. at 993. 
Fraud – Defining ‘Means of Identification’ under 18 U.S.C. § 1028A: 
United States v. Wilson, 788 F.3d 1298 (11th Cir. 2015) 
The 11th Circuit addressed “whether the use of someone’s name and 
forged signature on a United States Treasury check sufficiently identifies 
a specific individual to qualify as a ‘means of identification’ under 18 
U.S.C. §1028A.”  Id. at 1310.  The court noted that the 9th Circuit 
determined that “a forged signature constitutes the use of that person’s 
name and thus qualifies as a ‘means of identification’ under the statute[,]” 
while the 4th Circuit found that “a bare name alone was not sufficient to 
identify the specific individual as required under the statute[.]”  Id.  The 
11th Circuit agreed with the 9th Circuit, finding that the plain language of 
the statute supports its position.  Id. at 1310.  The statute plainly defines 
‘means of identification’ as “any name or number that may be used, alone 
or in conjunction with any other information, to identify a specific 
individual.”  Id. at 1311.  The 11th Circuit agreed with the 9th Circuit’s 
position that  “[b]y using the word any to qualify the term ‘name,’ the 
statute reflects Congress’s intention to construct an expansive definition 
that includes a signature.”  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).  Thus, 
the 11th Circuit concluded that the use of names and forged signatures on 
refund checks, standing alone, qualifies as a means of identification under 
18 U.S.C. §1028A.  Id. 
Mens Rea – Bank Fraud Act: United States v. Shaw, 781 F.3d 1130 
(9th Cir. 2015) 
The 9th Circuit addressed whether § 1344(1) of the Bank Fraud Act 
requires specific intent to defraud the bank itself.  Id. at 1131.  The court 
noted that the 2nd Circuit determined that the statute requires intent to 
specifically defraud the bank, while the 9th Circuit found that the statute 
only requires intent to harm any entity, regardless if the harm occurs to a 
specific person or a bank.  Id. at 1136.  The court disagreed with the 2nd 
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Circuit, reasoning that requiring specific intent would pose difficulty in 
prosecuting such crimes and because such an interpretation of the statute 
does not align with Congress’ legislative intent.  Id.  Thus, the 9th Circuit 
concluded that the only intent required to violate the Bank Fraud Act is an 
intent to harm any entity.  Id. 
Natural Resources  – Fish and Wildlife Protection: United States v. 
Hughes, 795 F.3d 800 (8th Cir. 2015) 
The 8th Circuit addressed whether or not a price of guide services in 
excess of $350 conclusively establishes a felony violation of the Lacey 
Act.  Id. at *8.  The court noted that the 5th and 9th Circuits determined 
that evidence of the price guide services is relevant to the market value of 
the wildlife.  Id. at *9–11.  The 8th Circuit disagreed with the 5th, 9th, and 
10th Circuits “[t]o the extent that [those circuits] hold that a price of guide 
services in excess of $350 conclusively establishes a felony violation.” Id. 
at *11.  The 8th Circuit stated that: “we believe that, in determining the 
market value of wildlife, the jury may consider evidence of the price of 
guide services.”  Id.  The court further noted that it agrees “with the [5th] 
and [9th] Circuits that evidence of the price of guide services is relevant 
to the market value of the wildlife but  “simply do not agree that it is 
always the same as the market value of the wildlife (or, for that matter, 
that it is always the best indication of the value of the game.”  Id.  (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  Thus, the 8th Circuit held that the jury may 
consider evidence of the price of guide services in determining the market 
value of wildlife.  Id. 
Standards of Review−Plain and Clear Error Review: United States v. 
Barela, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 14501 (10th Cir. Aug. 18, 2015) 
The 10th Circuit addressed whether a condition imposed on an 
individual’s supervised release that prohibited viewing, possessing, 
depicting, or describing sexually explicit conduct or pornography involved 
a greater deprivation of liberty than necessary, and thereby violated the 
First Amendment.  Id. at *2.  The 1st, 7th and 9th Circuits held that the 
similar ban on sexually stimulating material was plain error.  Id. at *18.  
On the other hand, the 6th and 8th Circuits held that there was no error in 
imposing a condition banning pornography and erotica.  Id.  Here, the 10th 
Circuit found the case at bar was more consistent with the 6th and 8th 
Circuit cases.  Id. at *18–19.  Thus, the court held there is no demonstrative 
clear and obvious error because of the defendant’s voracious history of 
pornography viewing.  Id. at *19. 
 
